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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J\llTSIC SERVICE CORPORATION,
A Corporation,
Plaintiff,
YS

CLEO \V ALrrON,

Case No.
10704

Defendant.

AP·P·ELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This i::; an action to quiet title to real property in
plaintiff, for trespass by defendant on said real property
eausing damage to plaintiff and for removal of def endant's encroachment upon said real property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court, without a jury, entered judgment quieting title to the disputed property in the defendant and
along a chain link fence following a described course;
disrni::;sing plaintiff's claim for damages and defendant's
conntPr-('laim for damages.
1

HELIEF SOlTG IIT ON" APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
Trial Court in the order of this Court quieting title to
the disputed property in the plaintiff. Plaintiff then seeks
a remand of the case to the lower Court for ih; decision
on the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff purchased certain real property belonging
to "White Investment Company from that said company.
(R. 50, Ex P-2) "White Investment Company had purchased said property from a Mr. C. vV. 'Wilkins and his
wife. (R. 49, Ex. P-1) The principal portion of said property was located south of 39th South at approximately
Central A venue. The property sold to plaintiff included
a strip of land 11..±8 feet "wide running from 3900 South
south to the principal portion. This strip of land is the
property in dispute in this action. Purchase of the striv
was necessary in order to give plaintiff access to tlw
principal portion of the property as access from Central
Avenue vvas blocked by a large, marshy bog and was an
essential access for development of the principal portion.

( R. 73)
The> strip ran between property owned by a Mr. P. L.
Jfonderson on tlw east and the> property uwned h:Y the
defendant on the 'vest. \Vhen Mr. Hendt,rson pm·chast-d
his property in February of 1960, the Jisputed prnperty
was bounded on either side by two wi r~, frncPs. ( R 8:2)
Both of the surveyors who testified at tlw trial, ~Ir.
Bush for plaintiff and l\Ir. Coon for defendant, stated
2

that when tliey had surveyed tht• pro1wrty m 1959,
tlw strip was bounded by the two wire fences and was
unoccnpiPd. (R 59, 99, 101)
Shortly after .Mr. Henderson purchased his propt'rty, he removed the two wire fences and built a new
chain link fenee along a line which he decided ·would
servP as the west boundary of his property. (R. 85)
'rhat line was and is actually the east boundary of the
strip in dis1rnte.
'l'lw east boundary of the defendant's property was
approximately 10 to 12 feet ·west of the chain link fence.
(R. G-t) Nevertheless, some time after Mr. Hende.rson
had Prected the chain link f PncP, defendant proceeded to
move his personal property, principally car bodies, (Ex.
P-8), onto the property in dispute and did occupy the
land up to tlw chain link fence and continues to so occupy.
:J[r. I-lenderson had, by Quit-claim Deed (Ex. P--1),
deeded any interest he had in the disputed property to
plaintiff's predecessor. Subsequent to plaintiff's purehase from \Yhite Investment Company plaintiff purehased tlw property to the east of the property in dispute
omwd h.'-' J\lr. Henderson.
Fpon lPaming that defondant had occupied the prop1•rty in dispute pnrehased from \Vhite Investment Com;1an~1, plaintiff made demand upon defendant to cease
saicl occupaney and cl0ar the strip. Defendant refused
:md this aetion was commc•n('ed on June 10, 1965.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.

The only contracts and deeds which were introduced
at the trial were introduced by the plaintiff (Exhibit
Index R-31). They show that the plaintiff acquired his
interest in the disputed property by a Uniform Real
l<jstate Contract from White Investment Company (R.
51, Ex. P. 2). 'Vhite Investment Company obtained fee
title by deed from C. \V. 'Vilkins and his wife (R. -19,
Ex. P-1). At the time the plaintiff took possession of
the property in dispute it was bounded by fenres and
there were no encroachments. (R-51) Plaintiff then examined a qualified engineer 'vho produced a plat he had
surveyed from the deed and the plat was introduced into
evidence. (R. 58, p. 5)
At no time in the proceedings did the defendant
challenge the validity of plaintiff's record title or introduce any evidence to show that he had record title. Therefore, under the case of Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62,
88 P. 696, (1907) plaintiff must prevail. In that case the
respondent plaintiff introduced in evidence a deed describing the parcel of land claimed by him, a survey made
by a competent engineer identifying the property described in the deed and proved possession in himself under
the deed and rested. 'l1he Court said:
1

''It may also be conceded that in order to prov<:> a
perfect or complete titlP thP plaintiff must connect his title with the original source of title,
nnlPss both he and his adversary claim from a
4

eomrnon source, in which event it is sufficient to
trace his title back to the common source. But
the question here presented is whether the respondent was required to show a perfect chain of
paper title in order to successfully resist the motion for nonsuit. This seems to be the contention
of counsel for appellant. \Ve think that all that
was required of respondent was to show a prima
facie title as against appellant. This we think,
respondent did when he produced his deed and in
connection therewith a survey clearly identifying the premises and showing pssession under or
pnrsnant to the deed. The deed and survey established the extent and boundaries of respondent's
premises and his possession under the deed certainly was some evidence of title to all the land
ineluded within the boundaries .... As against a
mPre technical objection by any one who, at the
time the objection is made, appears to be a mere
stranger to the title, such a prima facie title
would sePm quite sufficient. To require more
against such an objector would require everyone
to prove a pprfed chain of title or against every
stranger making any kind of a claim. This the
law dors not require. If the objector has a better
or stronger title than the prima facie title prevails."
'T'lw only other evidence of record title to the land
m question came from P. L. Henderson but he gave a
quitclaim Deed to plaintiff's predecessor. {P-4) This
dPed prevails above any prior oral agreement that may
have hePn made by Henderson with a third party under
the ease of Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah 523, 125 P. 2d
-1-13, (1932). In that casP the plaintiff did not show a perfoct rPcord title as against defendant's prior oral agree11wnt with tlw samP g-rantor but the Court said:
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"'l'he plaintiff in ejectment mmit recove1· upon
the strength of his own title and not upon th<•
·weakness of his adversary's title. This rule does
not require a plaintiff to exhibit a perfect chain
of title as against one in wrongful possession."
rrhe Court then held that the introduetion of a single
deed was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to p1·pvail
over the defendant who gave no evidence of rPcord title.
POINT II
DEFENDANT DOES NOT HA VE TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.

Section 25-5-1, Ltah Code Annotated (1953) provides:
"Estate or interest in real property. - No est ab"
or interest in real property, other than leases for
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or
power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than
by act or operation of la1v, or by deed or conveyance in writing suhscribt>d by the party cn~ating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or dPclaring
the same, or by his lawful agPnt tlwrt>unto antltorized by writing."
Under that statute tlwre are only two means by which
a person can acquire an intPrest in real property: one,
by "act or operation of law"; and two, hy a "cleed or
conveyance in writing." Defendant clearly does not ha Ye
a dP<:>d to the disputt>d property. No (lPPd wat:; ewr introduced in evidt>nce h.\T defendant. The det>d under
\Yhich defendant holds his own rn·orwrty was received in
Pvidenee as plaintiff's Bxhiliit P-7. Both plaintiff's sl11'6

veyor, 1l r. Bush and defendant's ;-rnrveyor, Mr. Coon,
testified that the l'ast boundary lme of the description
in said deed was the west boundary line of the property
in dispute. (R. (i..f:, 103) 11Ir. Coon, defendant's own witness, testified at R 103, '' 'l1his area in question would
he to the east of what we heliew the deed line to the
\V alt on property ~would be."
Defendant did not acquire the prnperty by act or
operation of law. Adverse possession \Yas not established.
8ection 78-1:2-12, l~tah Code Annotated (1953), provides:
''Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. In no case shall adverse possession be considered
Pstablished undt>r the provisions of any section of
this Code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes
which have been levied and assessed upon such
land according to law."
There is no evidence in the record that either defendant
or his lll'Pdt:'cessors paid any taxes assessed against the
property. Tlw only evidence relating to taxes is plaintiff's Exhibit P-3, which is a paid tax notice covering
the disputed property, addressed to Mr. Kenneth White,
plaintiff's predecessor in interest, and Mr. \:Vhite 's testi111on~' that lie paid the taxes assessed for that year.

(R. 50)
In addition to the abO\'e, defendant did not establish
a honndary line by acquiescence. 'l h0 line wh1eh the
Trial Court clPtennirn'd to he the boundary line was along
thP chain link fenet> built by J\lr. P. L. Henderson. (Find1
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ing No. IY, R. 33) .l\lr. Henderson testifiPd that he pmchased the property in .February of 1960 and built the
chain link fence later that year. (R. 83) The fence
then was only in existence for five years prior to the
filing of this action. In the case of King v. Fronk, 14 U.
2d 135, 378 P. 2d 873 ( 1963), this Court held that a
boundary line had been established between two adjoining land ovn1ers by a visibly monumented line which had
been in existence for at least a period of twenty years.
That holding did not appear to establish the twenty year
period as a necessity to the doctrine; however, the Court
did state that the seven year adverse possession period
would be too short. The seven years is only a period of
limitation, does not transfer title to the realty and requires compliance with specific statutory standards.
Therefore, the time necessary to establish a boundary
line by acquiescence would have to be at least more than
seven years. In the instant case, the monument line
determined by the trial court to be the boundary line
had been in existence for only five years. That is not
enough time within which to establish a boundary by
acquiescence.
It is clear that defendant did not establish title to
the property in question either by deed or conveyance
or by act or operation of law.
POINT III
NO BOUNDARY LINE WAS ESTABLISHED
AGREEMENT.

BY

The Trial Court found that in 19GO upon the building
of the ehain link f encP by 1\1 r. P. L. Henderson, he and
8

the dt>fendant agrt>Pd that said fence was to be the boundary line betwet>n their pro1>erties and that the said
agreemt>nt did in fact establish a boundary line. (F'indings of F'act III, lV, VII, VIII, IX, R. 33-35). We submit
neitht>r the law nor the evidence can support that conclusion.
As set forth in Point II hereof, Section 25-5-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides the sole method by which
an interest in real property can be created. ender that
statute any agreement for the transfer of real property
must be in writing. There is no such writing transferring
disputed property to defendant in the record of this
action.
In the Findings cited above, the lower Court found
a valid oral agreement. rrhe <1uestion becomes whether
there is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that
there was an oral agreement and, if so, whether such an
agreement would be legally valid.
The evidence does not support the finding of an oral
agreement. The only mention of any agreement, was Mr.
Henderson's testimony that he and defendant agreed to
take down the old fences and put up a new one. (R. 83)
Such an agreeuH:•nt \\'as necessary because one of the
fpnces taken out belonged to the defendant and was the
(•ast boundary line of his property. Mr. Henderson built
the chain link fence along a line which he decided would
:'p1·vt1 as his boundary. He actually claimed additional
grnund ( R. 8-t-) but that he had no particular use for it.
(H. S-t-) J\f r. Henderson also testified that he knew some
9

otht•r party had at least a right of way intPrest inmll'diately to the west of his lll'Opcrt.'·, but did not know who
the owner was. (R. 83 TherP is no tPstimony that he
agreed that the chain link f pnce \ms also defrndant's
boundar.''. He could not so agn-'P because hP knPw of
othn O\rnership. Everything done in relationship to the
chain link fencp \\·as the unilatPral act of Mr. lfrndPrson.
He removed tlw old fence (R 83 ). He cleared the gronnd
(R. 8:3). lie paid for the new fpn(·e ,,·ith no assistant('
from the defendant (R. 83). The defendant remained
silent during the llt-riod of construction. Although this
may he snfficiPnt evidence from which to find that l\h.
Henderson abandoned his interest in the propert:· w<>st
of the chain link fpnce, it is not sufficient for a finding
of an oral agreement for the transfer of real property.

In any event, we submit that t\\'O parties who are
not immediately adjoining land owners and who know
therp is a gap between their propertiPs (Finding Il, H.
32-33) cannot agree to establish a boundary line which
thereby results in the taking of the property of a third
person. Plaintiff has e:,;tablishPd record title to the strip
in question. 1\Ir. Henderson t('stifiPd that he knew sorne
other person had at least a right of 1rny interest iu the
disputed property. ( R. 83). Def e11cla11t 's <leecled rast
boundary linP stops short of the rhain link fence h.'· approximately 12 ft:•(•t, a fact ddPndant km•w or at tht:• very
lt>ast should have known. ln the faep of all these knmn1
factors, Mr. iiendPrson and ddendant sim1)l,\' rould not
('~;tahlish a linP \\·liieli wonl:l rPsnlt in tJw transfrring
of the record title of plaintiff's prrdcccssor to defc·rnlant.
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In the cas<' of TriJJP c. Bagley, 7-i L 57, :27G P. 912
( rn'.28)' this Court was faced with a 'iOmewhat similar
problem, although the parties were adjoining land owners, there being no third party owned gap as in the instant
case. In dispute was about six acres of land to which the
plaintiff Jwld rerord title. Defendant claimed ownership
of tlw land by virtue of an agreement between plaintiff
and his predecessors in interest, which agreement had
established a boundary line placing the six acres in defendant's boundaries. In discussing the law of the case,
tho Court pointed out that where a boundary line is
unknm\'n or uncertain, there can be a valid, oral agree1rn•nt establishing tht> line on tht> theory that such an
agn•ernent does not involve a transf e1· of land, but
only the definition of the deed under which the parties
hold title. But in that case, the Court found that as the
land had been surveyed, the true boundary line was certain. In finding for the plaintiff by holding that the
agreement as to tht> boundary line was invalid, the Court
set forth the rule,

"\\There co-terminus land owners know the location of the true boundary line, they may not establish a valid boundary line between their lands by
a nwre parol agreement at a place other than the
trne line." 'T'ri1JP v. Bagley, :276 P. 912, at 917.
Thu reason for that rule is that where the true line is

known an!' change in tlw line involves a transfer of land.
ln the instant ca~w tlw trm• honndary line ·was known.
Tlwre is ah~;olufrly no Pvidenre in the record of this
action to support tht• 'l1rial Court's finding No. 7 (R. 34)
thnt tl1P propc•rt)' in dispnte existed as a n•sult ''of land
!wing inae(·m·at<'l)' sm·v<·:·ed prior to tl1c• plat being
11

made." There is no evidenct: 'lvliat1;ot•vt-r of an~· inaccurate survey. Although the exact houndary line of Mr.
Henderson's property may have be£~n in dispute, the east
boundary line of defendant's property had heen smveyed, described and was clearly estahlished. As testified
to by both Mr. Bush and Mr. Coon, the defendant's east
boundary did not include the disputed property. (R. 62,
103). Therefore, even if the Court should find that
there was an agreement, any such agreement would he
invalid under the holding of Tripp r. Bagley. supra.
Any interest Mr. Hendl::'rson may havr' had in the disputed property was conYeyed by him to plaintiff's predecessor by a valid Quitclaim Deed. (Ex. P. -±)

l :..'

Plaintiff proved that it had actual, valid, reeord titlt~
to the disputed property. Defendant did not prov1~ any
title. as he did not obtain title by deed or <'.<mv1~yan<:1~ or
by aet or operation of law. There was no agn~errwnt fill
to the boundary line and even if th1~n~ wa.<.;, no sud1
agreement could dt-prive plaintiff, a strang1~r to any
agreement. of its property and for the ri~asorn; statl~d in
Point III any such agreement would he invalid, al-\ d1~
ft>ndant':;. true boundary line had been dearly 1~stablil-\h1~d
prior to the time of any alleged agr''''.llll'.nt. Ttwrd<H"'~,
th .. Court should re•erse the lower Court and quid tith~
tri th'=' di:,;.puted lJI'OfJPrty ll thf-' ulaintiff and J"l'.rIJaTJd th1~
(·a:'.'.:. :o th.:.- lo"-.,r Comi for a d"'t1·nuinati<m of plaintiff'H
dama.zes.
Rf:'sr~etfully submitt<~d,

('(JKE & \"I\"<:E\"T
BEA SL I\", :~ Y<i"\.:\ HJJ,
B:- JJJ\\"ELL \·. SL\L\IEHIL\ YS
.L\~f ES W. FHEEJJ
_\ttlJITJ'::::-: f r,r
Plaint.iff-A fJf>''.llant.
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